

エコポエティックス プラクシス
環境詩学と実践——エコクリティシズムの第4波に向けた問い

金津和美 (同志社大学)

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於 専修大学神田キャンパス1号館104教室

I. Serpil Oppermann, “The Future of Ecocriticism: Present Currents” (2011)

① “First wave” environmental criticism concerns itself with conventional nature writing and conservation-oriented environmentalism, which traces its origins to the work of Emerson, Muir, and Thoreau. “Second wave” environmental criticism redefines the environment in terms of the seventeen Principles of Environmental Justice and increasingly concerns itself with “issues of environmental Justice and increasingly concerns itself with “issues of environmental welfare and equity” and “critique of the demographic homogeneity of the traditional environmental movements and academic environmental studies” (Buell 112,115)...[Adamson and Slovic observe] a new third wave of ecocriticism, which recognizes ethnic and national particularities and yet transcend ethnic and national boundaries; this third wave explores all facets of human experience from an environmental view point. (15: quoted from Buell, 6-7)

② the idea of a “palimpsest,” or layering, of ecocritical trends, but perhaps it’s simply more difficult to visualize multiple layers of scholarly habits than it is to imagine successive waves rolling ashore from the sea of ecocritical ideas. The wave metaphor, apparently borrowed from the idea of first and second wave feminism, breaks down in the ecocritical context because of the waves do not simply end when a new wave begins. (15: quoted from Adamson and Slovic, 5)

③ “a sustainable ecocritical theory”の必要:

Yet it is exactly this rhizomatic picture we confront today that necessitates an comprehensive theoretical perspective which could accommodate the current ecocritical diversity. But, we must not associate “theory” with the de-ontological claims of radical constructivist thought which sees nature only as a discursive construct. Wheeler warns us about this stance. Ecocriticism’s confusing condition at present, as she pinpoints, “when conceptions and misconceptions are in conflict”(139), is due to the ambivalent attitude of ecocritics to theory as such, ambivalent because of their unresolved suspicion of the so-called linguistic turn in the Humanities, or more specifically the postmodern / poststructuralist line of thought, that still informs the disciplines from across the Humanities, with its prevalent question of whether creating a synthesis between the sign and its referent it ever possible. Since ecocriticism began as an attempt to see the world as unmediated by language, almost without exception the ideas derived from postmodern thinkers were viewed with deep distrust, especially in the first wave ecocriticism. Therefore, as Wendy Wheeler and Hugh Dunkerley note in their Introduction to the 2008 issue of *New Formations*, “[t]he contestation of the claim that earth-life and its creatures can be reduced to human linguistic endeavours alone has thus undoubtedly formed a central part of the development of ecocriticism”(8). Moreover, ecocriticism has so far rarely reflected on the problem of knowledge except to critique the so-called

anthropocentric regimes of truth in relation to the ecological discourses. This attitude, however, is nor subject to revision, albeit in a confusion of conflicting viewpoints as to how to theorize the field appropriately. (20)

④ “ecocentric postmodern theory”に向けた新たな模索、第4波へ:

If we are to continue seeing ecological phenomena as a “general text” to be read, then it is time we begin reading in terms of the relational logic of the new paradigm. This is what ecocentric postmodern theory suggests. It invites integrative interpretive strategies that collapse the traditional demarcation between the observing/reading subject and the passive observed/read object. This is how the dynamic complexity of the ecosystem and its intrinsic value become the systemic properties of a post modern ecocritical theory that can correlate ecological and literary ecocentric post modern theory brings to ecocriticism, especially by situating the ecocritical analysis of literary texts in a broader interpretive framework. It offers a unique alternative approach to the study of literature, providing more interrelational transactions between the human imagination and the endangered natural environments. Thus, conceptualizing our way out of the ecological crisis becomes possible. In developing ecocentric postmodern theory, it is my intention to close the gap between the textualist and the realist approaches and to open ecocriticism to the ecocritical analysis of postmodern fictions. With this insight in mind, I read postmodern ecocriticism as a voluntary exile from fixed boundaries, enabling us to perceive the world (natural-cultural-social-discursive reality) in all its correlations, plurality, and symmetries, and to understand in an integral way the relationships between discursive practices and the physical world. (25)

II. Jonathan Bate *The Song of the Earth* (2000)

① “Revealing lays claim to the arts most primally”: poetry is our way of stepping outside the frame of the technological, of reawakening the momentary wonder of unconcealment. For Heidegger, poetry can, quite literally, save the earth. Why poetry more than all the other arts? Because another distinctive feature of the human mode of being is that we are language-animals. For Heidegger, language is the house of being; it is through language that unconcealment takes place for human beings. By disclosing the being of entities in language, the poet lets them be. That is the special, the sacred role of the poet. What is distinctive about the way in which humankind inhabits the earth? It is that we dwell poetically (dichterisch). (258)

② But advanced Westerners are perforce of the *polis*. We live after the fall, in a world where no act of reading can be independent of the historical conditions in which it is undertaken. It is therefore not surprising that ecocriticism should have emerged at a time of ecological crisis; it is to be expected that those who practice this kind of reading should be sympathetic to some form of Green politics. Marxist, feminist and multiculturalist critics bring explicit or implicit political manifestos to the texts about which they write. They regard their work as contributing towards social change. Green critics have a difficulty in this respect: it would be quixotic to suppose that a work of literary criticism might be an appropriate place in which to spell out a practical programme for better environmental management. This is why eco-poetics should begin not as a set

of assumptions or proposals about particular environmental issues, but as a way of reflecting upon what it might mean to dwell with the earth. Eco-poetics must concern itself with consciousness. When it comes to practice, we have to speak in other discourses.

The dilemma of Green reading is that it must, yet it cannot, separate eco-poetics from ecopolitics. (266)

III. Kate Rigby “*Earth, World, Text: On the (Im)possibility of Ecopoiesis*” (2004)

① Despite this admission of the prior self-disclosure of nature, and its call to and upon us, Heidegger does nonetheless insist that, through language, humans have a privileged role to play in giving voice to phusis, speaking things, as it were, into Being. As Bate boldly restates the Heideggerian case, “things need us so that they can be named.” This seems to me to risk falling back into the hubris of that anthropocentrism which has always assumed language to be an exclusively human prerogative, forgetting, as Robert S. Corrington puts it, that the “human process actualizes semiotic processes that it did not make and that it did not shape. Our cultural codes, no matter how sophisticated and multivalued, are what they are by riding on the back of this self-recording nature.” From an ecocentric perspective, one which allows to earth, sky, and divinities a plurality of voices of their own, it is not so much that things need us so that they can be named; rather it is we who need to name things so that we can share understandings about what we perceive and value, what we fear and desire how we should live and how we should die.... The vital question now is whether it will survive our efforts to name, tame, and recompose it. In this context, we need poets not so much to draw things into Being through their song, but rather to draw us forth into the polyphonic song of our nonhuman earth others. (433-34)

→ “an eco-poetics of negativity” の必要

IV. Mary Jacobus, *Romantic Things: a tree, a rock, a cloud* (2012)

① In *The Future of Environmental Criticism* (2005), Lawrence Buell directs attention to first-wave ecocriticism’s resistance to anthropocentrism: its attempt to eliminate the human figure from the imaginary landscape. Some versions of pastoral environmentalism have adopted the idea of “deep ecology,” or what the Norwegian environmental philosopher Arne Naess calls “the relational, total field-image” where all organisms are equal (“knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relation”). Such radical ecocentrism (which has Heideggerian affinities, but from the left rather than the right) has been redefined as a recognition of the interdependence of human and nonhuman, a relational web with no divide between living and nonliving. One extension of this holistic understanding of deep ecology would be to pursue Nussbaum’s capabilities argument into the area that she herself resists: justice is justice for all organisms, not just for human or animal life. But a program of environmental justice involving a halt to human encroachment on the natural world (via population control, or a ban on nut gathering) would be hard to implement and anyway risks being accused of ecofascism. A more acceptable program in the aesthetic realm might be what Bate calls the unrealizable “dream of a deep ecology,” or “thought-experiments and language-experiments which imagine...a reintegration of the human and the Other.” Seductive as this utopian dream of reintegration may be, however, it refuses the nonequivalence that linguistic and philosophic poststructuralism have taught us. I want to return

in closing to Merleau-Ponty, whose embodied perception offers a phenomenological alternative to Heideggerian dwelling, while insisting that touch is neither mutual, reflexive, nor contingent. (75)

V. Timothy Morton, *Ecology without Nature* (2007)

① われわれは、例としてありふれた道具、すなわち一足の農夫靴を選ぼう。その叙述のためには、この種の使用道具の現物を提示することすら要しない。誰でもこのもののことを承知している。しかしながら、直接的な叙述が肝要なのだから、具体的な説明を容易にすることは有益であるかもしれない。このような助け船には絵画的な描写で足りる。われわれはそのためヴァン・ゴッホのよく知られた絵を選ぼう。彼はそのような靴を何度も描いている。しかし、何がそこに見られるのか。靴に欠かせないものが何であるかは誰もが知っている。それが木靴



や^{どんが}鞆皮の靴でないなら、そこには革製の靴底と革の甲とが見出され、両者は縫い目と靴釘とによって接合されている。そのような道具は足に履くのに用いられる。畑仕事に用いるのか、あるいはダンスに用いるのかに応じて素材〔質量〕と形態〔形相〕とは違ってくる。

そのような正当な言明は、ただわれわれがすでに知っていることを解明しているにすぎない。道具の道具存在はその有用性にある。しかし、有用性それ自体はどうなっているのだろうか。われわれは有用性によってすでに道具の道具的なものを把握しているのだろうか。それに成功するためには、われわれは役に立つ道具を、それが役に立っているという点において、探求する必要はないだろうか。畑にいる農婦は靴を履いている。ここではじめて、靴は靴にほかならないものである。農婦が労働にさいして靴のことを考えなければ考えないほど、あるいはそれどころか靴を注視しなければしないほど、あるいはただ感じさえしなければしないほど、それだけ靴はますます真正に靴が〔本来〕それであるところのものとなる。農婦はその靴を履いて立ち、歩む。そのようにして靴は現実的に役立つ。道具使用のこのようななりゆきに即して、道具的なものがわれわれに現実的に出会ってくるにちがない。(『芸術作品の根源』39-40)

② Heidegger turns the shoes inside out to reveal the environment in which they come to exist. But why, anachronism aside, did he choose a dirty pair of peasant shoes rather than, say, something like a box-fresh pair of sneakers made in a sweatshop and worn in the projects? The environmentalness of the shoes is a function of modern capitalist society despite Heidegger's best efforts to disguise the fact. There is an ideological flavor to the substance of Heidegger's description. It is a form of Romanticism: countering the displacements of modernity with the politics and poetics of place. The gesture is always aware of its futility. It is a cry of the heart in a heartless world, a declaration that if we just think hard enough, the poisoned rain of modern life will come to a halt. Meyer Shapiro's argument that these are a city dweller's shoes undermines the lyrical heft of the passage, which does appear tied to a heavy investment in the primitive and the feudal. But even on Heidegger's own terms, the shoes are distinctly modern, in their very

primitivism.

Romantic environmentalism is a flavor of modern consumerist ideology. It is thoroughly urban, even when it is born in the countryside. (172)

VI. Timothy Morton, *Hyperobjects* (2013)

① “object-oriented ontology (OOO)”と Heidegger の “tool-analysis”:

The frequent visitor to my writing will perhaps be somewhat puzzled, even disconcerted, by the substantial use of Heidegger. In the past I have described Heideggerian philosophy as regressive and unsuitable for thinking some of the more significant features of what I have called *ecology without Nature*. I have come to recognize that it is not so much Heidegger as a type of Heideggerianism against which I have been reacting. If anyone gives us a vivid sense of the uncanny strangeness of coexistence, it is Heidegger. I have also come to understanding, against Levinas, that it is indeed on the terrain of ontology that many of the urgent ecological battles need to be fought.

The reason for my turn to Heidegger are, without doubt, not acceptable to Heideggerianism at large, and this means that certain strands of thinking in Heidegger are also rejected. The concept *world* remains deeply problematic, as the subsection on that concept in part 2 makes clear. The frankly ontotheological positing of humans as the most important entity, and of German humans and the quintessence of this importance, is also ruthlessly rejected. It is through OOO that this book owes its debt to Heidegger. There is something attractive—perhaps suspiciously also, as it resonates with a Christian image—in the idea of a stone that the builders rejected becoming the cornerstone of new thinking. The time of hyperobjects makes use of what appears merely to be a broken tool lying round in the workshop of thinking—I refer to Heidegger’s tool-analysis, which Harman’s strikingly innovative appropriation of it, lay around in the shop, halfheartedly handled by pragmatism and ignored by deconstruction. The turn to the tool-analysis in OOO and in “thing theory” is welcome. (22-23)

→ Graham Harman, *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects* (2002)

VIII. Timothy Morton, *Dark Ecology: For a Logic of Future Coexistence* (2016)

① Anxiety is intrinsic to the human, since it’s what remains when you subtract all the things onto which it has latched itself, like Alien, to discharge its energy. Anxiety is when things lose their significance, when one is thrown back on oneself, as if knowing oneself as a broken tool that sticks out of oneself, an absurd, disturbing loop. I don’t mean that humans are different or unique. Rather, the reverse. Not that bottles of Coke have angst (how do I know? I’m not a bottle of Coke) but that, instead of distinguishing me from other entities (Heidegger), anxiety is how I experience myself as a *thing*. Anxiety shows me that I am an entity among others. And since anxiety is an intrinsic part of human being, trying to rid ourselves of it as agrilogistics promises could only result in violence.

Anxiety is *elemental*. I experience myself as a thing insofar as this thing is no longer objectifiable: it seems to immerse me such that distinctions between self and other, far and near, become inoperative. How Heidegger describes anxiety could indeed describe a zero degree of ecological awareness, a sense of being *a set of things without specific or specifiable members* (we’ll

clarify that idea soon enough): “neither does anxiety ‘see’ a definite ‘there’ and ‘over here’ from which what is threatening approaches....

The elemental effect is the inverse of what is called *thing theory*. Thing theory relies on Heidegger’s tool analysis. When a tool breaks or malfunctions we notice it. This theory of malfunctioning points out that when things smoothly function, when they just happen, they withdraw from access. When I’m involved in a task the things I involve myself with disappear. Yet the element in which I am involved doesn’t disappear. This is a precise definition of the element: the appearance of involvement. It’s just that I only experience this appearance obliquely, perhaps as goosebumps or a sense of horror or of bliss. (78-79)

② *Anatomy of ecognosis* (129):

The Guilt (131) → *The Shame* (133) → *The Melancholy* (135) → *The Horror* (136) → *The Realm of Toys* (141) → *The Ridiculous* (144) → *The Ethereal* (145) → *The Hollow* (147) → *The Sadness* (148) → *The Longing* (152) → *The Joy* (153)

③ *The Sadness*. Inside the congealed Hollow is a liquid Sadness. This sadness is not the trauma of relating to one’s wounds from other things, the wounds that make me what I am. This sadness is a liquid inside the wounds. It does not have an object; it is an object. This being-an-object is intimately related with the Kantian beauty experience, wherein I find experiential evidence without metaphysical positing that at least one other being exists. The Sadness is the attunement of coexistence stripped of its conceptual content....

When you experience beauty, you experience evidence in your inner space that at least one thing that isn’t you exists. An evanescent footprint in your inner space—you don’t need to prove that things are real by hitting them or eating them. A nonviolent coexisting without coercion. The basic issue with beauty is that it is ungraspable. I can’t point directly to it and I can’t decide whether it’s me or the thing that is emanating beauty. There is an undecidability (not total indeterminacy) between two entities—me and not-me, the thing. There is a profound ambiguity. Beauty is sad because it is ungraspable; there is an elegiac quality to it. When grasped, it withdraws, like putting my hand into water. Yet it appears. This thing I am finding beautiful is beautiful to me. It is as if it is definitely this thing and not that thing. I have accepted that a thing is a narcissist; I have stopped trying to delete my own narcissism. The beauty experience just is narcissism, inclusive of one or more other entities. A narcissism in me that isn’t me, including me and the thing in its circuit: ecognosis. (148-49)

IX. Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy* (1992)

① Hence: In the center of Kant’s moral philosophy stands the individual; in the center of his philosophy of history (or, rather, his philosophy of nature) stands the perpetual progress of the human race, or mankind. (Therefore: History from a general viewpoint.) The general viewpoint or standpoint is occupied, rather, by the spectator, who is a “world citizen” or, rather, a “world spectator.” It is he who decides, by having an idea of the whole, whether, in any single, particular event, progress is being made. (57-58)

② We were talking about the partiality of the actor, who, because he is involved, never sees the meaning of the whole. This is true for all stories: Hegel is entirely right that philosophy, like the owl of Minerva, spreads its wings only when the day is over, at dusk. The same is not true for the beautiful or for any deed in itself. The beautiful is, in Kantian terms, an end in itself because all its possible meaning is contained within itself, without reference to others—without linkage, as it were, to other beautiful things. In Kant himself there is this contradiction: Infinite Progress is the law of the human species; at the same time, man’s dignity demands that he be seen (every single one of us) in his particularity and, as such, be seen—but without any comparison and independent of time—as reflecting mankind in general. In other words, the very idea of progress—if it is more than a change in circumstances and an improvement of the world—contradicts Kant’s notion of man’s dignity. It is against human dignity to believe in progress. Progress, moreover, means that the story never has an end. The end of the story itself is in infinity. There is no point at which we might stand still and look back with the backward glance of the historian. (77)

③ 最も優れた政治的判断＝美的判断 (from Beiner, “Interpretive Essay”) :

From what I have said thus far, it should be somewhat clearer why Arendt would immediately and most naturally turn to Kant for counsel on the question of judgment. But another, perhaps more subtle, reason suggests why Kant so dominated Arendt’s thinking about judgment. For this, the decisive clue is provided by the one and only passage in *The Human Condition* that refers to the faculty of judgment:

Where human pride is still intact, it is tragedy rather than absurdity which is taken to be the hallmark of human existence. Its greatest representative is Kant, to whom the spontaneity of acting, and the concomitant faculties of practical reason, including force of judgment, remain the outstanding qualities of man, even though his action falls into the determinism of natural laws and his judgment cannot penetrate the secret of absolute reality.

Human judgment tends to be tragic judgment. It continually confronts a reality it can never fully master but to which it must nonetheless reconcile itself. Arendt finds in Kant a unique expression of this tragic quality associated with judgment. This helps us also to see why the image of the spectator is so vital and why the burden of judgment is conferred wholly upon the judging spectator. In history, as in drama, only retrospective judgment can reconcile men to tragedy:

We may see, with Aristotle, in the poet’s political function the operation of a catharsis, a cleansing or purging of all emotions that could prevent men from acting. The political function of the storyteller—historian or novelist—is to teach acceptance of things as they are. Out of this acceptance, which can also be called truthfulness, arises the faculty of judgment.

Political judgment provides men with a sense of hope by which to sustain them in action when confronted with tragic barriers. Only the spectator of history is in a position to proffer such hope. (This is in fact the preponderant message of Kant’s explicitly political writings.) And if a concern with judgment leads one into an awareness of tragic imperatives, perhaps only a thinker with a full appreciation of those tragic realities (which Kant did indeed possess) could penetrate to, and capture in theoretical terms, the essence of judgment.

For Arendt the act of judging represents the culmination of the tripartite activity of the mind because, on the one hand, it maintains the contact with “the world of appearances” that is

characteristic of “willing,” and, on the other hand, it fulfills the quest for meaning that animates “thinking.” Hence Arendt agrees with Pythagoras that in the festival of life “the best people comes as spectators.” She departs from Pythagoras, however, in her denial that it is the truth-seeking of the philosophers that corresponds to this spectatorship. In her account the contemplative function of the judging spectator supplants the discredited contemplative function of the philosopher or metaphysician. The life of the mind reaches its ultimate fulfillment not in the comprehensive vision of a metaphysics, as it did for the ancients, but in the disinterested pleasure of the judging historian, poet, or storyteller. (143-44)

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